Abstract-Many electronic voting systems, classified mainly as homomorphic cryptography based, mix-net based and blind signature based, appear in the eighties after zero knowledge proofs were introduced. The common ground for all these three systems is the fact that none of them works without real time cryptologic computations which should be held on a server. As far as known, the agent-based approach has not yet been used in a secure electronic voting system. In this study, an agentbased electronic voting schema, which does not force real time computations on the server side and lets people vote at home, is proposed. Conventional cryptologic methods are used in the proposed schema to ensure some of the requirements of an electronic voting system where some of the requirements are constructed within distributed agent phenomena.
I. INTRODUCTION
Voting is the basic element of the republics for years and due to the conveniences it will bring, it can be foreseen that electronic voting systems will be a requested element of democracies in the future. Electronic voting systems are designed to offer better performance and economy than the conventional ones where speed and simplicity of tallying obtained by electronic voting systems are other benefits. Trustworthiness is another topic, and might be widely argued. It can be said that a system which does not get involved with the human factor is reasonably more secure; however, the functioning of a conventional voting system can be checked by the majority of people whereas an electronic voting system's security can only be checked by a few experts. In our work, we suppose that electronic voting systems where security of the system is proved technically are more secure than conventional ones. In this paper, electronic voting refers to a voting system where authorized individuals cast their votes through a large-scale communication system independently, and the agent refers to a software object executing a set of operations due to definitions set by the voting system. Current electronic voting systems can be classified in three categories: homomorphic cryptography based [1] , [2] , blind signature based [3] , [4] and mix-net based [5] , [6] . In homomorphic cryptography based systems, generally, encrypted ballots of each voter is added into the same data package and * Bulent Orencik is with The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey Information Technologies Institute 41470, Gebze, Kocaeli, Turkey Email: bulent.orencik@bte.mam.gov.tr decrypted as a whole using a master key which is different than any of the voters' key. Yet, this explanation can vary due to the cryptographic algorithms used. In blind signature based systems, each voter blinds his/her ballot to hide its contents before the ballot have been signed by an authority, then sends the signed ballots to a collective pool that undertakes tallying after unblinding them. Lastly, mix-net based systems composed of several hosts queued in an array. In these systems, each host in the array receives a group of encrypted ballots as input and while producing a permutation of the ballots as output, partially decrypting them; where at the end of the array, ballots are totally decrypted and permutated.
As far as known, use of agent-based approach in electronic voting systems is not yet examined in detail. Agentbased approach has many advantages in comparison to its conventional counterparts. Distributing the computational cost and standardization are the main benefits like many other agent systems. Agents can be customized just before the election and the authority can gain required control, which is enough to execute a fair election, over the voter's host. For example, the whole communication of the voter's host can be interrupted during the voting phase to prevent trojan horses remotely control the host. In a large scale election, individual voters cannot be trusted, so voter behaviour has to be standardized. Voting interfaces might be altered by unfair voters, yet agents reside on hosts only during the vote casting phase, which makes them more resistive to be altered. Consequently, with throughly analyzed security mechanisms, agent-based approach may be the answer for an election system that the voters can cast votes anywhere without any officer supervising the procedure.
Current approaches to electronic voting systems require one or more servers which compute cryptologic algorithms for authorization, encryption, communication, etc. Cryptographic computations and the network load are generally the bottlenecks of these systems. Using agent-based approach, a significant part of the cryptographic computations can be run on the voters' hosts instead of servers. Also, the number of network transactions is less than conventional algorithms as the agents can carry their own data embeddedly.
II. REQUIREMENTS OF ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS
Generally, requirements of electronic voting systems differ from country to country and sometimes from election to election. For example, it is not even allowed to keep records whether a voter casts a vote or not in Germany, where this record is essential in Turkey.
Report of the National Workshop on Internet Voting [7] defines the requirements of electronic voting systems in U.S., clearly. Seven of these requirements consider security issues, while the others consider economic or social issues which we are not interested in. The seven requirements are as follows:
• Eligibility and Authentication-only authorized voters should be able to vote; 
III. PROPOSED SCHEMA

A. Preliminaries
We propose an agent-based offline electronic voting system. The voting system consists of three phases, three parties and two agents named ballot and register. The parties are the authorities, the voters and the tallying pools. The phases are registration, vote casting and tallying. An optional vote changing phase can be added between the vote casting and the tallying phases which is explained in section III-B. Each phase in the schema affects the following phases, so security issues of previous phases have to be ensured while analyzing the security of a phase. Fortunately, in the proposed schema, any security leakage that does not reveal the private key of one of the authorities or one of the pools affects only the related voter, not the system. For the sake of simplification, we will assume that there are only one authority server and one pool server on the schema till section III-C where we consider multiple servers.
In the registration phase, each individual voter is registered as an authorized voter. During registration, voters can be identified by officers or biologically; voters' keys can be stored in smart cards or memory sticks, etc. Independent of the method, it is assumed that each individual voter receive his/her unique key pair and the data needed to trigger the voting phase. It is clear that the security of the key pair is up to the voter if there is not any integrated hardware or password protection for the keys. In the vote casting phase, each individual voter gathers two agents and interacts one of them which collects and sends the vote to the pool anonymously. Second agent interacts with the first agent and authorizes the voter.
In the tallying phase, collected messages in the pool are decrypted, counted and published.
The authority is the party that stores each individual voter's public key and also has its own key pairs. One of the authority's key pair is used during vote casting phase and the other is used during vote changing phase. The authority stores an array of registered voters to determine whether a voter casts a vote or not.
The pool is the party that gathers the encrypted candidate votes and decrypts them.
The voter triggers the vote casting/changing phase by running the agent framework.
The register agent authorizes the user and ensures the authority whether the voter casts a valid vote. The register agent carries one of the private keys of the authority.
The ballot agent interacts with the voter and sends the candidate votes to the pool.
B. Workflow 1) Registration phase:
It is assumed that each voter registers via authorized election offices. A key pair belongs to the voter delivered to the authority and the public key of the authority is delivered to the voter. Thus, we do not deal with key distribution issues in our schema.
2) Offline encrypting and signing: The authority embeds the private key of the authority into each register agent, encrypts the agents using a session key and finally encrypts the session key and signs the package with the related voter's public key, forming Message 1 ; while the pool signs the ballot agent using its private key, forming Message 2 .
3) Vote Casting: Vote casting consists of nine steps which are visualized in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 . In the figures, the time sequence of the messages is indicated with a number at the beginning of each message followed by a colon, where the content of the messages, which can be followed from Table I , are indicated with their indexes. Voter's identification number is encrypted with authority's public key, and concatenated to the identification number that is encrypted with the voter's own private key.
2) The authority decrypts the first part of the incoming message using one of its private keys, then decrypts the second part using voter's public key. If two parts of the message are equal and meaningful, the authority searches for the voter's identity. If the voter has not been registered, the process will be cancelled. 3) The authority searches for the voter's identity. If the voter has not yet casted a vote, the register agent is sent to the voter as Message 1 . 4) The voter decrypts the register agent appropriately and activates it. Register agent sends a message to the pool to receive the ballot agent, and after a successful transaction, it activates the ballot agent. 5) The ballot agent asks the voter to cast a vote. The vote is concatenated with a random number, blinded [8] as explained in section III-C and sent to the register agent as Message 4 . 6) After signing the blinded vote with the authority's private key and sending it to the ballot agent as Message 5 , the register agent terminates itself. 7) The ballot agent unblinds the data to obtain the signed vote shown as Message 6 , hashes the signed vote to form Message 7 and encrypts it with the pool's public key, forming Message 8 . The ballot agent stores the hash in the voter's host and sends the signed vote to the pool. After acknowledging the voter that the vote was casted, it terminates itself. 8) The voter creates Message 9 which consists of two fragments; voter's identification number encrypted with authority's public key, and an acknowledgment text encrypted with voter's private key. 9) Processing the message, the authority marks the voter's identity in the array of voters.
4) Vote Changing:
In the proposed schema, each voter can change his/her voting strategy until the end of the election. The authority has another private key for this process which will be mentioned as alternative key pair. This new key pair lets the authority discriminate a vote changing voter from a vote casting voter. Vote changing process is very similar to vote casting as explained in detail below:
1) The voter sends Message 10 , which consists of two fragments, to the authority to trigger the voting process. Voter's identification number is salted 1 
5) Offline Tallying:
After the vote casting phase is finished, the pool filters the collected messages (Message 8, 15 ) to obtain the plain votes. The process is as follows: Collected messages are decrypted using pool's private key to obtain the messages (Message 6 , M essage 13 ||Message 7 ). The pool hashes all messages and forms the list of the hashes of the messages prior to check if the hashes that were once concatenated are really mapping another message in the recently created list of hashes. If this is the case, mapped message is deleted; if not, the fake message which is pointing a non-existent message via the fake hash and the hash of this fake message are deleted. At the end of this process, valid messages and valid hashes which are mapping the messages must remain. All of the messages are decrypted appropriately using one of the public keys of the Table II, Table III and Table IV . 
C. Security Issues
Seven requirements of a trustworthy electronic voting schema are ensured as follows: • Eligibility and Authentication-is ensured during the registration phase by officers or biologic authentication methods. During the vote casting or vote changing phase, it is not possible to activate an instance of the register agent if the voter is not authorized.
• Uniqueness-is ensured by the pool during the tallying phase. The pool accepts only the original votes or the votes which was fairly changed by the voter.
• Accuracy-is ensured by the pool during the tallying phase. It can be ensured that a vote is stored correctly if the pool also stores a hash mapping the vote.
• Integrity-is ensured by simply counting the number of vote casters in the authority and the number of valid votes in the pool to detect deleted or added votes. Any modification can be detected with the help of hashes. Therefore, it has to be ensured that the hashes are not altered also, we will mention this issue later in this section.
• Verifiability and Auditability-is ensured by the pool and the voter. Each voter can check the hash of his/her vote to ensure that his/her vote is counted fairly in the final tally.
• Reliability-is ensured by the agent-based approach. As the vote casting and tallying are executed independent of each other, any temporary connection problem during the vote casting or tallying phase will not affect the whole system.
• Secrecy and Non-coercibility-is ensured by the ballot agent as it creates random numbers and concatenates them to the plain text votes. It is not able to be claimed that a voter has created that precise random number. Some other security issues have to be discussed except these requirements; agent security problems, secrecy problems and DoS attacks which can make the schema suffer. Fortunately, there are some methods to resist.
By salting the messages in the first and eighth step of the vote changing phase and sending the identification number after encrypting with voter's private key in the first step of the vote casting phase, the schema resists against replay attacks which can pave the way for denial of service.
To keep the plain text vote of a voter secret, blinding method is used in the vote casting and vote changing phases. Blinding can be achieved easily for an RSA encryption schema by executing the following algorithm, where n, e, d, v refer to the common modulus, the private key, the public key and the plain text vote, respectiveley: A random blinding factor b is created and the number x = vb e (n) is calculated using authority's public key and the vote. x is sent to the register agent. Register agent calculates the number
and sends it back to the ballot agent. Ballot agent unblinds the number by calculating
Using more than one server in the pool side makes the schema resist against voter secrecy problems that are built on traffic analysis. As the votes are encrypted in a random order using servers' public keys, the servers can be thought as a mix-net during the tallying phase. Also, we are ensured that the votes or the hashes mapping them can not be changed if there is at least one fair server. Performance drawbacks of mix-nets are relatively not important in our schema since the tallying phase is executed offline.
The most problematic issue of the schema can be counted as the security of the agents and the framework. As we mentioned before, leakage of authority's private key which is embedded in the register agent is lethal for the security of the schema. However, the software agents will not let people execute themselves unauthorized, it might be possible to create valid votes using authority's private key and sending them to the servers at the pool side. Although, detecting the surplus votes is easy by comparing the number of valid votes in the pool's records and the number of vote casted voters in the authority's records; it is not possible to find which votes are fake, which is an undesirable situation that probably causes a confused crowd of people. On the other hand, voters should be ensured that the authority is not distributing any kind of malicious software through agents or the framework. A neutral To solve this issue ideally, agents have to reside over the agent framework which is just an interface to use hosts' resources. Agents interact each other directly, not through the framework, as shown in Fig. 5 . Furthermore, either functioning of the agent or its data has to be hidden. Fortunately, [9] proposes a solution against data leakage from an agent which can be used together with other methods [10] which protect agents against misbehaving agent frameworks. Hohl's method is messing up the code and data of the agent while keeping its functions unchanged until its expiration time. This method can be safely used in our schema as an election expires after a few hours. Furthermore, it is possible to deliver fair frameworks which are signed by the authority or any certification mechanism to the voters during the registration phase. Agents can check whether the frameworks are modified or not by hashing the framework codes while starting. It is also possible to embed a random number into voter frameworks during registration phase which makes each framework's hash unique. In this way, register agents can check each voter's framework independently. This approach also let voters use any of the hosts connected to the communication network.
Besides mentioned issues, using multiple servers in the authority side has three advantages. First, it causes a homogenous network traffic which is always desired. Second, if authority's private key is grabbed in some way, it only affects the local authority. Since, it is not possible to embed a fake vote without perception; a court can decide to repeat the election only for that locale. Third, period of offline encryption and signing phase can be reduced due to parallel computing.
IV. SIMULATIONS, THE MATHEMATICAL MODEL AND FEASIBILITY
In the simulations a locale including an authority server, a pool server and 1000 voters is used as a case. All of the hosts, including the servers are Java2 1.5.04 Virtual Machines running on Windows 2000 Professional operating systems installed on PCs with AMD Athlon 1000MHz processors and 512MBs of RAM. The same simulation is repeated 1000 times for statistically correct measurements. Using the results obtained from this test bed, it is possible to estimate the feasibility of a large scale election.
The mean time is 2280ms with a standard deviation of 672ms to create an 1024bit RSA key pair; 1122ms with a standard deviation of 113ms to form an encrypted and signed register agent; 1373ms with a standard deviation of 165ms to form a signed ballot agent; 16ms with a standard deviation of 8.7ms to decrypt and count a vote. The size of a register agent is measured 4438bytes and the size of a ballot agent is measured 5589bytes.
Total [s] .n l where n l stands for the number of layers.
Using this mathematical model, a virtual election can be set and its requirements can be calculated. Our scenario is based on a virtual election of 8 hours with 10 000 000 participating voters each of whom casts a vote and not changing it later. Each link between computers are assumed to be 56kbps. Authority side forms up of 10 000 parallel PC and pool side forms up of five layers each has 2 000 parallel PCs. According to the equations below, preparing the election in the offline encrypting and signing phase takes approximately 19min, migration of the register agent takes 634ms, migration of ballot agent takes 798ms, total tallying time takes 7min and finally minimum required bandwidth is 782bps.
The obtained results may seem quite good, but we have to keep in mind that this estimation is not concerned about the resources used for communication except the migration of agents, the resources used for the queries in the databases, the resources used in vote changing. Also our model is assumed to be linear in parallelism and in database queries which is hardly reflecting real life situations. The expenses mentioned above are hard to determine from any kind of simulations practically. Besides, significantly low bandwidth requirement and the idle time between each process encourage the practical use of this schema. From another point of view, this low utilization may lead us to decrease the number of resources of which are utilized more to make the elections cheaper. The best results are expected to be obtained after the statistical investigation of the voter behaviour during the past elections.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Many electronic voting systems ensure the required security issues using many network transactions and cryptologic computations. On the contrary, using agents, we observe that some security mechanisms and cryptologic computations can be transferred into the voter's computer reducing the load on the servers during a large-scale election. Moreover, offline computations make the schema attractive and eliminate the necessity of expensive servers. If the servers are distributed homogeneously, each server can act mostly as a file server instead of executing cryptologic computations.
Another advantage of using agent-based approach is its flexibility. Each computer can be customized and supervised remotely and any modification in the voting system can be transferred to all of the computers easily with the help of agents just before the election. This approach also eliminates the necessity of certificating and authorizing each host since a certified agent framework prepares the required habitat for agents to live independent of the underlying environment and prevents undesired intervention. Furthermore, agents are designed to run in heterogeneous environments by nature which makes this approach highly portable.
